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Abstract
Unconventional fiscal policy uses announcements of future increases in consumption
taxes to generate inflation expectations and accelerate consumption expenditure.
It is budget neutral and time consistent. We exploit a unique natural experiment
for an empirical test of the effectiveness of unconventional fiscal policy. To comply
with European Union law, the German government announced in November 2005
an unexpected 3-percentage-point increase in value-added tax (VAT), effective in
2007. The shock increased households’ inflation expectations during 2006 and actual
inflation in 2007. Germans’ willingness to purchase durables increased by 34%
after the shock, compared to before and to matched households in other European
countries not exposed to the VAT shock. Income, wealth effects, or intratemporal
substitution cannot explain these results.
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I Introduction
Governments around the world struggle to stimulate the economy. Large stocks of
sovereign debt limit the scope of fiscal stimulus, whereas the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates and inflated central bank balance sheets constrain conventional and uncon-
ventional monetary policy. Macroeconomists have recently proposed unconventional fiscal
policy measures to stimulate demand by changing intertemporal prices. Unconventional
fiscal policy differs from fiscal stimulus or tax rebates because it does not rely on income
effects, is time consistent, and is budget neutral.
Shapiro (1991), Feldstein (2002), and Hall (2011) propose pre-announced increases
in value-added tax (VAT) to generate consumer price inflation and stimulate spending
via intertemporal substitution without increasing the federal budget deficit.1 Correia,
Farhi, Nicolini, and Teles (2013) formalize these ideas in a framework with a binding
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. An increasing path of consumption taxes
and a decreasing path of income taxes generates inflation expectations, negative real
interest rates, and stimulates consumption but does not distort the production decisions
of firms.2 They find these policies can fully offset the zero lower bound constraint without
relying on inefficient commitments on low future interest rates or wasteful government
spending. VAT-change announcements are also a salient policy measure to generate
inflation expectations. Because of these appealing features of unconventional fiscal policy
compared to other fiscal policy or unconventional monetary policy measures, testing for
its effectiveness is important.
This paper proposes an empirical test for the effect of unconventional fiscal policy on
households’ willingness to purchase durable goods. The ideal experiment would consist of
an exogenous announcement of higher future consumption taxes and a cut in income
taxes. We exploit a natural experiment in Germany that is close to such an ideal
experiment. In November 2005, the newly formed German government unexpectedly
announced a 3-percentage-point increase in VAT, effective in January 2007. Two features
make this announcement uniquely suited to test for the effect of unconventional fiscal
policy compared to other changes in VAT. First, the European Union (EU) imposed
the announcement on the German administration to avoid an infringement procedure for
1Feldstein (2002): “This [VAT] tax-induced inflation would give households an incentive to spend
sooner rather than waiting until prices are substantially higher.”
2Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) discuss similar ideas in a Ramsey taxation model.
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the breach of the Maastricht Treaty. The VAT increase was therefore unexpected and
unrelated to prospective future economic conditions, and qualifies as an exogenous tax
change due to inherited fiscal deficits in the taxonomy of Romer and Romer (2010).3
Second, Germany had no monetary sovereignty as a member of the European Monetary
Union. The European Central Bank explicitly excluded any increase in nominal interest
rates to counteract the price pressure from a higher VAT in Germany. 4
The VAT announcement affected all German households. We cannot study the
behavior of German households alone, because we miss a counterfactual. Our empirical
design uses matched households in EU countries not exposed to the VAT shock as a
control group for German households, in a difference-in-differences identification strategy.
We match German and foreign households based on observables to ensure no systematic
differences in the demographic composition of German and foreign households drive the
results. We show directly that before the VAT announcement, no difference existed in
the behavior of German households and households in other EU countries. In particular,
German and foreign households behaved similarly in terms of inflation expectations and
purchasing propensities before the VAT announcement. We cannot reject they follow
parallel trends.
The VAT announcement increased German households’ inflation expectations in
2006, and the increase in VAT increased actual consumer price inflation in 2007. The
announcement did not affect the inflation expectations of households in other EU
countries. The VAT announcement increased German households’ willingness to purchase
durable goods throughout 2006, with a peak of a 34% higher willingness to buy durable
goods compared to other EU households in November 2006. A back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests the 3-percentage-point increase in VAT resulted in 10.3% higher real
durable consumption growth.
Before studying the natural experiment, verifying that European households change
their consumption decisions when their inflation expectations change is crucial. This
condition is necessary for unconventional fiscal policy to affect consumption through
intertemporal substitution. This baseline step is needed because earlier literature finds
3In Section V, we argue in more detail why this shock was unrelated to future economic conditions,
and was exogenous to German households’ expectations regarding current and future income.
4Policymakers believed the increase in consumer price inflation would be temporary and limited to
Germany. Even the German representative on the ECB board at the time excluded an increase in nominal
rates to offset inflationary pressure. Weber (2006): “We know what the effects of the VAT increase are;
as is the case for oil prices, we do not consider one-off effects.”
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conflicting results on the relationship between inflation expectations and household-level
spending. Bachmann, Berg, and Sims (2015) and Burke and Ozdagli (2014), using
data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers and the New York Fed Survey on
Consumer Expectations, find no economically or statistically significant association
between households’ inflation expectations and their readiness to spend on durables.
Using similar data from the New York Fed, Crump et al. (2015) find a large positive
association. In Japan, Ichiue and Nishiguchi (2015) find households that expect higher
inflation plan to decrease their future consumption spending.
We use micro data from the market research firm GfK. GfK surveys a representative
set of 2,000 German households on a monthly basis to measure expectations about
business-cycle conditions on behalf of the European Commission. Based on a sample
from January 2000 through December 2013, Figure 1 shows a positive correlation
between German households’ inflation expectations and their willingness to purchase. The
figure plots the average monthly willingness to purchase durable goods across surveyed
households, against the share of households that expect higher inflation in the following
12 months.5 A positive correlation of 0.59 is present between inflation expectations and
the readiness to spend on durable goods. This positive correlation is statistically different
from zero throughout the sample period, and its size is larger after the announcement and
before the actual VAT increase (blue points).
In our multivariate analysis, households that expect higher inflation are on average
8% more likely to report it is a good time to buy durable goods, compared to households
that expect constant or decreasing inflation. Households expecting higher inflation are
also less likely to save, which suggests overall consumption increases with higher inflation
expectations. The average marginal effect of inflation expectations varies substantially
across demographics. The association is higher for household heads with a college degree,
for high-income households, and for non-retired households.
We then move on to the natural experiment. We first document the announcement
of the VAT increase in November 2005 led to an increase in inflation expectations of
Germans in 2006. Realized inflation increased in 2007 after the actual increase in VAT.
Within the EU, this pattern was unique to Germany.
For identification, we proxy for the behavior of German households absent the shock
with a group of similar households not affected by the shock. We obtained access to
5We describe the data and the construction of our variables in detail in Section II.
3
Figure 1: Readiness to spend on durables and inflation expectations
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This figure plots the average monthly readiness to purchase durables on the y-axis against the average
monthly inflation expectation. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer
Climate survey to construct these variables. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013.
confidential micro data from the same EU business-cycle survey for three additional
countries: France, Sweden, and the UK.6 We first verify households in these countries
behave similarly to German households before the shock, and are more willing to purchase
durable goods when they expect higher inflation.
Our identification strategy is based on a difference-in-differences design: we compare
German households’ willingness to purchase durables with the willingness of households
in other European countries, before and after the VAT shock. We match German
households with foreign households that are observationally equivalent, because our
baseline analysis shows substantial heterogeneity in the marginal effect of inflation
expectations on consumption behavior across demographics. Consistent with a causal
effect of unconventional fiscal policy on households’ purchasing attitudes, we find a
large treatment effect of the VAT shock on durable expenditure via increased inflation
expectations of German households. We also find large effects of the unexpected increase
in VAT using real durable consumption growth, which confirms the theoretical prescription
6All our results hold when we only use French households, as we discuss in Section IV.
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of Correia et al. (2013).7
In a large class of models, changes in VAT might affect households’ decisions
to purchase durable goods through income or wealth effects rather than inflation
expectations. We show that German households’ income expectations did not change after
the government announced a change in VAT, and hence income effects cannot explain our
results. As for wealth effects, changes in non-distortionary taxes do not change household
behavior under Ricardian equivalence. If Ricardian equivalence fails, a tax increase results
in a negative wealth effect, which would suggest our design identifies a lower bound of the
true effect.
Inflation expectations might also affect consumption decisions through a redistribu-
tion channel in state-of-the-art heterogeneous-agent models. In Section IV, we argue a
sizable redistribution channel is unlikely in our setting. We also argue housing-wealth
effects and uncertainty channels are unlikely drivers of our results.
Shapiro (1991) emphasizes the effect of unconventional fiscal policy should mainly
operate through expenditure on durable goods. A potential concern for policymakers
aiming at stimulating overall consumption is that households might substitute intratem-
porally from non-durable to durable consumption, because our VAT change targeted
nondurable goods less than durable goods.8 We do not observe directly households’
attitudes toward purchases of non-durable goods. To address this concern, we show
realized non-durable consumption growth increased in Germany during 2006, which is
not consistent with intratemporal substitution driving our results. German households
also lowered their savings attitudes during 2007 in absolute terms and relative to matched
foreign households, which suggests households increased their overall consumption (see
Table 6).
Using cross-sectional micro data to study the relationship between unconventional
fiscal policy, inflation expectations, and willingness to spend has a set of advantages
compared to using aggregate time-series data. First, the cross-sectional nature of the
data allows us to document the time-varying effects of unconventional fiscal policy on
purchasing behavior after the announcement and before the effectiveness of the VAT
7We discuss the relation between our empirical findings and the theoretical work of Correia et al.
(2013) in Section V in detail.
8All services and products in Germany are subject to VAT. The general tax rate was 16% until
December 2006, and increased to 19% in 2007. A reduced rate of 7% applies to many convenience goods
such as food, books, or flowers. The reduced rate has been unchanged since 1983.
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increase. Second, micro data allow us to match households based on their demographics,
which is important because different demographics have different reactions to changes in
inflation expectations. Last, our survey data allow us to control for income expectations,
employment status, and housing choices that might affect the consumption response to
the announcement of the VAT increase.
Our analysis contains caveats. The survey consists of repeated cross sections of
households. We cannot exploit within-household variation in inflation expectations to
control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the household level. The rich
set of household demographics allows us to match households before and after the VAT
announcement and across countries to alleviate this concern. Moreover, the survey elicits
only a measure of households’ willingness to purchase consumption goods, and we do not
observe actual purchases. In Figure A.1 in the online appendix, we show households’
average willingness to spend closely tracks the realized consumption expenditure on
durables. A third potential shortcoming is that the survey elicits only qualitative measures
of inflation expectations. However, evidence suggests quantitative inflation expectations
bunch at salient threshold values, and households often report large positive and negative
inflation expectations (see Binder (2015)).
A. Related Literature
Some recent papers study the effects of sales-tax changes on purchases (see, e.g., Crossley,
Low, and Sleeman (2014), Cashin and Unayama (2015), and Cashin (2016)). Our
research design and natural experiment have unique features that allow us to study the
effect of unconventional fiscal policy compared to the VAT changes in these papers. A
crucial difference is that the Japanese and the UK government had monetary and fiscal
sovereignty to provide additional fiscal and monetary stimulus. The VAT changes in
the UK and Japan were also unlikely to be exogenous to future economic prospects or
unexpected. Moreover, changes in VAT affect the whole population of the UK and Japan,
so these changes do not allow construction of counterfactuals based on households that live
in the same monetary union. Because households’ inflation and income expectations are
not available in those data, one cannot use them to disentangle income or wealth effects
from intertemporal substitution. Intertemporal substitution is the only channel through
which announcements of VAT changes affect consumption in models of unconventional
6
fiscal policy.
Papers that use sales-tax changes often aim to estimate the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (IES). We do not see our paper as part of this literature, because we focus
on purchases of durable goods rather than on the flow consumption of durables. Changes
in consumption taxes can increase expenditure through intertemporal substitution if
households bring forward consumption. But tax changes can also alter expenditure when
households bring forward expenditure of storable goods without changing consumption
decisions, which is an arbitrage effect. Policymakers care about stimulative effects of
inflation expectations, and shocks to inflation expectations might result in large increases
in consumption expenditure even with small estimates of the IES. Studies in this literature
either use aggregate time-series data, or do not observe household expectations and
income, or cannot distinguish between prices and quantities. They do not incorporate the
response of durable consumption into the IES estimate, or do not aim to rule out changes
in VAT being related to future economic conditions, and therefore do not disentangle
different channels or identify causal effects. We also differ from Cashin and Unayama
(2015) and Cashin (2016), who assume any deviation in consumption from trend is due
to the VAT change.
Pre-announced VAT increases are a salient way to generate future consumer price
inflation. The salience of consumption taxes could be an advantage of using taxes to
generate inflation and to engineer negative real interest rates (Wiederholt (2016)). A
literature on the effect of sales-tax holidays suggests consumers in the United States
change their consumption patterns around temporary changes in sales taxes (see Agarwal
et al. (2013)). Sales-tax holidays in the United States are announced well in advance, and
last for short periods of time around peaks of demand, such as back-to-school periods.
They apply to a small set of goods. The predictability and seasonality of the tax holidays
make consumers likely to shift consumption over time. The short time period, often
just two or three days, and the small set of goods involved make assessing the macro
implications and ruling out other channels difficult. In addition, the temporary tax cuts
reduce tax revenues rather than being budgetary neutral or generating revenues. Sales-tax
holidays can only be stimulative if they are not pre-announced (see Correia et al. (2013)).
We also relate to Mian and Sufi (2012) and Green, Melzer, Parker, and Pfirrmann-
Powell (2014), who study fiscal stimulus offering temporary subsidies for the purchases
of new cars. They document a temporary increase in car sales followed by a drop in
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sales. The car subsidy also changes intertemporal prices, but our paper differs in several
ways. First, unconventional fiscal policy, contrary to government subsidies, does not lead
to higher budget deficits, and is especially relevant in times of high government deficits.
Moreover, we study how a change in VAT, which applies to almost all consumption goods,
affects the overall willingness to purchase, as opposed to the purchases of specific items.
We show our results operate through intertemporal substitution, whereas fiscal stimulus
might operate through an income effect and/or intratemporal substitution.
Unconventional monetary policy, such as forward guidance, aims to generate inflation
expectations through low interest rates until after the end of the liquidity trap. Future
government spending also operates through an inflation-expectations channel. Bachmann
et al. (2015) question the effectiveness of these policies, because they do not find any
association between inflation expectations and consumption propensities. Dupor and Li
(2015) do not find evidence consistent with government purchases stimulating inflation
expectations. Del Negro, Giannoni, and Patterson (2015) and McKay, Nakamura,
and Steinsson (2015) question the power of forward guidance. Unconventional fiscal
policies might therefore be a suitable alternative to unconventional monetary policy and
conventional fiscal policy, especially during periods of large government budget deficits
and inflated central bank balance sheets.
Households with higher inflation expectations are more willing to purchase durable
goods in all European countries we study and in periods outside of the VAT experiment.
This result is consistent with a large theoretical literature that emphasizes the stabilization
role of inflation expectations on the monetary policy and fiscal policy sides.9 From a
historical perspective, Romer and Romer (2013) argue deflation expectations caused the
Great Depression, whereas Eggertsson (2008) and Jalil and Rua (2016) suggest a fiscal and
monetary policy mix engineered higher inflation expectations and spurred the recovery
from the Great Depression. From an international perspective, Hausman and Wieland
(2014) study the monetary easing of the Bank of Japan and the expansionary fiscal policy
commonly known as “Abenomics.” Their time-series evidence is consistent with higher
inflation expectations raising consumption and GDP.
9For instance, see Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Eggertsson (2006), Werning
(2012), Eggertsson (2011), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Woodford (2011), and Farhi and
Werning (2015).
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II Data
A. Data Sources
We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey.
GfK conducts the survey on behalf of the Directorate General for Economic and Financial
Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European Commission.10 GfK asks a representative repeated
cross section of 2,000 German households questions monthly about general and personal
economic conditions, inflation expectations, and willingness to spend on consumption
goods. We obtained access to the micro data for the period starting in January 2000 and
ending in December 2013. Our sample period includes large variation in macroeconomic
fundamentals, two major recessions, and an unexpected increase in German VAT in 2007.
We use the answers to the following two questions in the survey to construct the
main variables in our baseline analysis:
Question 8 Given the current economic situation, do you think it’s a good time to
buy larger items such as furniture, electronic items, etc.?
Households can answer, “It’s neither a good nor a bad time,” “No, it’s a bad time,” or
“Yes, it’s a good time.”
Question 3 How will consumer prices evolve during the next twelve months compared
to the previous twelve months?
Households can answer, “Prices will increase more,” “Prices will increase by the same,”
“Prices will increase less,” “Prices will stay the same,” or “Prices will decrease.” We
create a dummy variable that equals 1 when households answer, “Prices will increase
more,” to get a measure of higher expected inflation.11
Households’ inflation expectations are highly correlated with their perception of past
inflation (see Jonung (1981)). We also use survey question 2 in our baseline analysis to
disentangle the effects of inflation expectations from inflation perceptions:
Question 2 What is your perception on how consumer prices evolved during the last
twelve months?
10We use similar data from the harmonized surveys of DG ECFIN for several other European countries
in section IV. We discuss the data in more detail in the online appendix.
11Results do not change if we introduce separate dummies for the individual answer possibilities (see
Table A.1 in the online appendix).
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Households can answer, “Prices increased substantially,” “Prices increased somewhat,”
“Prices increased slightly,” “Prices remained about the same,” or “Prices decreased.”
The online appendix contains the original survey and a translation to English.
We also use questions regarding expectations about general economic variables,
personal income or unemployment, and a rich set of socio-demographics from the GfK
survey. In robustness checks, we use data on contemporaneous macroeconomic aggregates,
such as GDP and unemployment numbers from the German statistical office (DeStatis),
nominal interest rates, the value of the German stock index DAX, and measures of
European and German policy uncertainty from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The
online appendix describes in detail the data sources and variable definitions.
B. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics. On average, 20% of households say it is a good
time to buy durables, 24% say it is a bad time, and the others are indifferent. Fourteen
percent of households expect higher inflation in the following 12 months. More than 80%
of respondents think prices in the previous 12 months increased substantially, somewhat,
or slightly, with equal proportions for each answer. Only 13% think prices remained the
same, and essentially nobody thinks prices decreased.
The sample is balanced between women and men. Most respondents completed high
school, but have no college education.12 The mean household’s size is 2.5, and the majority
of households live in cities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants.
Panel C of Table 1 reports statistics for households’ personal expectations. Most
households think their financial situation has not changed in the previous 12 months, and
they expect the same for the future. Most households do not save or save only a little,
and expect a constant or slightly increasing unemployment rate. In Panel D of Table
1, we describe descriptive statistics for the macroeconomic aggregates during our sample
period.
We plot the time series of inflation expectations and the willingness to purchase
durable goods in Figure 2, and verify the series are unconditionally highly correlated.
Both inflation expectations and the average willingness to purchase spike after the
announcement and before the actual increase in VAT.
12Most respondents completed either Hauptschule or Realschule, and only 8% of respondents have a
college degree.
10
Actual inflation increases in January 2007, but peaks later in the year (see Figure 3).
Anecdotal evidence suggests many retailers delayed price increases because they feared a
stark drop in demand.13 The German statistical office shows some categories immediately
and fully adjusted prices, such as tobacco and services, whereas other categories adjusted
prices with a delay, such as electronics and furniture. By early 2008, all categories
underlying the German CPI had fully adjusted their prices by the theoretical amount.14
We discuss in detail in Section V the relation between inflation expectations and actual
inflation, willingness to purchase durables, and actual purchases.
III Inflation Expectations and Consumption
Expenditure
Unconventional fiscal policy can affect purchasing propensities via an inflation-
expectations channel only if households’ willingness to purchase reacts to changes in their
inflation expectations. In times of fixed nominal interest rates, the Euler and Fisher
equations predict a positive association between consumption and inflation expectations.
Earlier literature, however, found conflictive evidence in micro data for the United
States. In this section, we document a positive association between households’ inflation
expectations and their willingness to purchase durable goods. The size of the association
varies substantially across demographics. This result informs the construction of our
difference-in-differences identification strategy that matches German households with
demographically similar households in other EU countries.
A. Econometric Model
Our outcome variable of interest, households’ readiness to purchase durable goods,
derives from discrete, non-ordered choices in a survey. We therefore model the response
probabilities in a multinomial-logit setting.
We assume the answer to the question on the readiness to spend is a random variable
representing the underlying population. The random variable may take three values,
y ∈ {0, 1, 2}: 0 denotes it is neither a good nor a bad time to purchase durable goods;
13We thank Emi Nakamura for emphasizing this point.
14See: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/WirtschaftStatistik/Preise/MwSterhoehungJan2007.pdf.
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1 denotes it is a bad time to purchase durable goods; and 2 denotes it is a good time to
purchase durable goods.
We define the response probabilities as P (y = t|X), where t = 0, 1, 2, and X is an
N × K vector where N is the number of survey participants. The first element of X
is a unit vector, and the other K − 1 columns represent a rich set of household-level
observables, including demographics and expectations.
We assume the distribution of the response probabilities is
P (y = t|X) = e
Xβt
1 +
∑
z=1,2 e
Xβz
(1)
for t = 1, 2, and βt is a K × 1 vector of coefficients. The response probability for the case
y = 0 is determined, because the three probabilities must sum to unity. We estimate the
model via maximum likelihood to obtain the vector βt of coefficients for t = 1, 2, and set
the category y = 0 as the baseline response.
We compute the marginal effects of changes in the covariates on the probability that
households choose any of three answers in the survey, and report them in the tables.
B. Baseline Estimation
Table 2 reports the average marginal effects computed from the multinomial logit
regressions. We cluster standard errors at the quarter level (56 clusters) to allow for
correlation of unknown form in residuals across contiguous months. In all columns,
we report the marginal effect of the inflation-increase dummy on the likelihood that
households respond that it is a good time to buy durables. In column (1), the
inflation-increase dummy is the only explanatory variable. Households that expect
increasing inflation over the following 12 months are on average 6.2% more likely to answer
that it is a good time to buy durables compared to households that expect constant or
decreasing inflation.
Perceptions of past inflation shape households’ expectations about future inflation
(Jonung (1981)). Controlling for past-inflation perceptions increases the marginal effect
of inflation expectations on the willingness to buy durables (see column (2)). High
perceptions of past inflation decrease the marginal propensity to consume durables,
consistent with the consumption Euler equation.
12
Households differ in their purchasing propensity (see, e.g., Attanasio and Weber
(1993)). Household characteristics that determine both purchasing propensities and
inflation expectations might be systematically related, and hence, controlling for the
observed heterogeneity across households is important. In columns (3)-(5) of Table 2,
we add a rich set of demographics, expectations about personal and macroeconomic
variables, and contemporaneous macroeconomic variables. The results are similar across
specifications. All marginal effects are virtually identical if we do not condition on
past inflation. A back-of-the-envelope calculation implies the marginal effect of inflation
expectations on the willingness to buy durables translates into 4.8% higher real durable
consumption expenditure if all Germans expect higher inflation. During the period
after the announcement and before the actual increase in VAT, our back-of-the-envelope
calculation implies the increase in VAT by 3 percentage points resulted in a 10.3% higher
real durable consumption growth.15
C. Heterogeneity of the Effect
Table 3 studies the variation in the baseline effect by household characteristics. We first
consider respondents’ education. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3 report the marginal effects for
our baseline specification estimated separately for survey participants with a Hauptschule
degree (lowest level of formal education) and those with college education. Households
with low levels of education that expect inflation to increase are 6.9% more likely to have
a positive stance toward buying durables compared to households that expect constant
or decreasing inflation (column (1)). This marginal effect increases with education, and
is more than 60% larger for household heads that hold a college degree (column (2)).
We find a 20% higher marginal effect of inflation expectations on the likelihood of
wealthier survey participants with a monthly net income above EUR 2,500 to reply that
it is a good time to buy durables (column (4)), compared to survey participants with a
monthly net income less than EUR 1,000 (column (3)).
Retirees have different time-use and consumption patterns compared to the
working-age population (see Aguiar and Hurst (2005)), typically have nominal pensions
15To reach this suggestive conclusion, we regress the natural logarithm of real durable consumption
expenditure at the quarterly frequency on the end-of-quarter value of the average durable purchasing
propensity and quarterly dummies, and multiply the resulting coefficient of 0.5396 by the marginal effect
of 8.88% (column (4) of Table 2) and 19.09% for the period of the natural experiment (see column (1) of
Table A.2 in the online appendix).
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in Germany, hold few real assets, and have lower human capital compared to someone in
the labor force. The marginal effect of inflation increases on the willingness to spend is
lower for those aged 65 or higher (column (6)) than for the younger population (column
(5)).
IV Natural Experiment and Identification Strategy
A. Exogenous Measure of Unconventional Fiscal Policy
The ideal experiment to test for the effect of unconventional fiscal policy on consumption
expenditure would consist of an exogenous increase in future consumption taxes with
an accompanying cut in income taxes to offset the effect of consumption taxes on labor
supply and real wages. To the best of our knowledge, no country has yet explicitly
implemented the full set of measures of unconventional fiscal policy discussed by Correia
et al. (2013) and others. We thus identify an exogenous policy shock that closely resembles
unconventional fiscal policy following a narrative approach (see Romer and Romer (2010)).
This measure should be unexpected, should not increase the budget deficit, and should
have affected households’ inflation expectations, but not their income expectations.
In November 2005, the newly formed German government unexpectedly announced
a 3-percentage-point increase in the VAT, effective January 2007. The narrative record
suggests the VAT increase was legislated for reasons unrelated to future economic
conditions. The EU mandated the increase to ensure the German deficit over GDP would
fall below 3%.16
In each year between 2001 and 2004, Germany posted a deficit-to-GDP ratio above
3%. In 2003, the European Commission opened a procedure against Germany for
infringement of the 3% deficit-to-GDP rule. The German government proposed plans
to reduce the ratio to 2.9% in 2005 to avoid fines. It became obvious during 2005 that
Germany could not deliver on its promises, and the actual deficit-to-GDP ratio was 3.3%
for 2005. The European Commission re-opened the deficit procedure and announced in
November of 2005 it would fine Germany if the ratio was not below 3% by the end of
2007. The newly elected right-left government announced in November 2005 an increase
16The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 requires all EU countries to have “annual deficits no greater than 3%
of GDP.”
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in VAT by 3 percentage points, from 16% to 19%, effective in January 2007.
The increase in VAT was unrelated to future economic conditions in Germany, and it
was adopted to satisfy the requirements of the EU Stability and Growth Pact.17 Based on
these reasons, we argue the VAT increase falls within the exogenous tax-change category
following the taxonomy of Romer and Romer (2010).
A pre-announced VAT increase in a fixed-nominal-rates environment resembles the
unconventional fiscal policies to stimulate spending through higher inflation expectations
described in Correia et al. (2013). Hall and Woodward (2008) argue along similar lines
for sales-tax holidays to generate an increasing path of consumption taxes over time and
stimulate current spending. Hall (2011) emphasizes the use of consumption taxes to alter
intertemporal prices.
The announcement of the VAT increase is a shock to inflation expectations, and
should result in higher consumption expenditure as long as nominal interest rates do not
increase sufficiently to leave real rates constant. Germany is part of the Euro area, and
the ECB is responsible for monetary policy and price stability in the whole currency
union. The ECB did not tighten monetary policy to counteract the increase in inflation
expectations in Germany. Nominal borrowing rates for consumption loans were 6.7% in
January 2006 and 6.4% in December 2007 (see Figure A.2 in the online appendix).
The VAT increase in January 2007 should result in higher inflation expectations
of German households throughout 2006. Figure 3 shows German households started
to adjust their inflation expectations upwards immediately in January 2006. Inflation
expectations remained high for the rest of 2006, and reverted once the VAT increase was
in effect in January 2007. Realized inflation started to increase in January of 2007, and
remained high throughout the year.
B. Difference-in-Differences Approach
The VAT shock alone does not allow a causal test for the effect of unconventional fiscal
policy on consumption expenditure, because all German households were exposed to the
same shock. For identification, we miss a counterfactual: a group of households not
affected by the shock, but similar to German households before the shock. We design a
strategy in the spirit of Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999).
17We discuss in more detail the narrative sources, the scope of the VAT increase, and the relation
between future VAT increases and inflation expectations in Section V.
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The European Commission conducts harmonized surveys in all EU countries. We
obtained access to the confidential micro data for three additional countries (France,
Sweden, and the UK) through national statistical offices and GfK subsidiaries. We use
the households in these three countries to construct our control group.
Our identification strategy is a difference-in-differences approach: we compare
German households’ readiness to purchase durables with that of households in other
European countries, before and after the VAT shock.
We estimate the average treatment effect of the VAT shock on the readiness to
purchase durables as
(DurGerman, post −DurGerman, pre)− (Durforeign, post −Durforeign, pre), (2)
where DurGerman, post is German households’ average readiness to purchase durable goods
after the announcement of the VAT increase, DurGerman, pre is German households’
average readiness to purchase durable goods before the announcement of the VAT increase,
and Durforeign, post and Durforeign, pre are the analogous averages for foreign households
not exposed to the VAT shock.
C. Identifying Assumptions
The parallel-trends assumption is a necessary condition for identification. In our case, it
requires that our control group behaved similarly to German households both before and
after the shock, had the shock not happened. We cannot test whether the parallel-trends
assumption holds after the shock, because we miss the counterfactual of no shock. We
therefore test whether the trends are parallel before the shock. If they are, our identifying
assumption will be that foreign households behave like German households would have
behaved absent the shock throughout the sample period.
The top panels of Figure 4 and Figure 5 provide graphical evidence that the parallel-
trends assumption seems satisfied in our setting. The trends in inflation expectations
and purchasing propensities are parallel for German and foreign households before the
announcement of the VAT increase (November 2005). Starting in January 2006, both
the German households’ inflation expectations and willingness to buy durable goods start
to increase substantially. Trends for foreign households do not move compared to the
pre-shock period.
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The middle panels of Figure 4 and Figure 5 repeat the exercise when comparing
German households to French households only. France and Germany face the same
monetary policy, share a common border, and are structurally similar. The similarity
of pre-shock trends is even more pronounced when we only use French households as a
control group. In the bottom panels of Figure 4 and Figure 5, we also compare the trends
for German households and for households in the UK and Sweden. Cavallo, Neiman,
and Rigobon (2014) show firms within the euro area harmonize prices of durable goods.18
Even in this case, the parallel-trends assumption seems plausible.
Importantly, Table 4 verifies households in each of the three foreign countries display
a positive association between inflation expectations and willingness to consume durable
goods (columns (1)-(3)). In column (4), we report the corresponding baseline effect for
German households, excluding the period after the announcement of the VAT increase
and before the actual increase. Foreign households are therefore likely to react to increases
in inflation expectations in a similar fashion as German households, which alleviates the
concerns regarding the external validity of our strategy.
D. Matching Foreign and German Households
We match households in Germany with households abroad to account for the heterogeneity
in responsiveness to inflation expectations we document in Section III, and the large
heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume to fiscal policy shocks Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2014) document. We first match each German household in each month with a
household in another country, interviewed in the same month, with similar demographic
characteristics. We use a nearest-neighbor algorithm to match households based on
propensity scores.19 We estimate propensity scores with a logit regression of the treatment
indicator on gender, age, education, income, and social status. Our samples are repeated
cross sections, and we cannot track German and matched foreign households before and
after the shock. We perform a second level of matching, which pairs up similar households
interviewed before and after the shock separately within the German and the foreign
survey waves.
18We thank Brent Neiman for suggesting this test.
19All the results are virtually identical if we perform the monthly matching using a group of control
households for each German household, and we minimize the difference in observables of the German
household and the group of foreign households.
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The matching exercise is meaningful only for German and foreign households in the
common support of the distributions of the propensity score for the two groups. In Figure
6, we plot the distribution of the propensity score for the treatment group (red) and the
control group (blue). Households are distributed across the full range of the propensity
score in both groups.
Moreover, we formally test whether household characteristics are balanced after
the matching process. In Table 5, we report the mean of the matching categories for
matched households in the control group and treated group as of June 2005, our baseline
month before the announcement of the VAT increase. Columns (3) and (4) test the null
hypothesis that the means across the two groups are equal. We cannot reject the null for
any of the five matching variables.
All our results are similar or become stronger if we only use households from France
as a control group. Using a larger pool of control households increases the size of the
common support, and improves the balancing of matched households’ characteristics ex
post.
E. Threats to Identification
Changes in VAT might affect households’ decisions to purchase durables through channels
different from inflation expectations. A positive average treatment effect in equation (2)
might reflect those other channels, in which case we could interpret our finding only as an
impulse response of consumption expenditure to the announcement of a VAT increase, as
opposed to the causal effect of unconventional fiscal policy on consumption expenditure
through inflation expectations. We test below whether the VAT shock affected households’
expectations other than inflation expectations, which might affect the readiness to spend
on durables irrespective of inflation expectations and discuss alternative channels.
The change in VAT could affect the consumption behavior of Germans through
income and wealth effects rather than intertemporal substitution. The increase in VAT
might lead households to adjust their income expectations upward.20 Figure 7 plots
the evolution of average income perceptions and income expectations over the next 12
months together with inflation expectations. The announcement of the VAT increase
does immediately increase average inflation expectations, whereas the average perception
20Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) provide a recent overview of the literature on the consumption response
to income changes.
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of income and the average expectation of future income do not move.
An announced increase in non-distortionary taxes should not alter the behavior of
German households through wealth effects in a Ricardian world. If Ricardian equivalence
does not hold, an increase in non-distortionary taxes should result in a negative wealth
effect and lower consumption expenditure.21 We would identify a lower bound of the
causal effect in such a world.
Modern heterogeneous-agent models prominently feature a redistribution channel of
surprise inflation from lenders to borrowers (see Doepke and Schneider (2006)). Under
the assumptions of all goods being subject to the higher VAT and 100% tax incidence
on the consumer side, we would expect an increase in consumer price inflation of 2.59%.
However, the change in inflation is only a surprise for loan contracts that existed already
before November of 2005 and matured after December 2006. For this subset of contracts,
we do expect a redistribution of nominal wealth from lenders to borrowers after the
actual increase in VAT. At the same time, the increase in VAT was permanent and should
result in a reduction in wealth corresponding to 2.59% of lifetime consumption under
the assumption that consumers do not change their consumption bundle after the VAT
announcement. The net wealth effect of an increase in VAT is therefore most likely
negative for both borrowers and lenders, and we would again identify a lower bound.
More elaborate models with financial constraints or hand-to-mouth consumers might
offer alternative channels. We cannot test for all alternative channels with our data.
However, financial constraints or hand-to-mouths behavior are unlikely to drive our
findings, because tax increases should result in lower consumption expenditure in these
alternative models.
A housing-wealth channel and home-equity extraction were contributors to the boom
before the Great Recession (see, e.g., Mian and Sufi (2011)). Germany has a home-
ownership rate of only around 43% compared to two thirds in the United States, but
also experienced negative house-price inflation throughout the 2000s (see Figure A.3 in
the online appendix). Appendix Table A.3 shows similar marginal effects for renters and
owners. A housing-wealth channel is therefore not likely to be an important contributor
to our findings.
We discuss in Section V other concurrent policy changes, one of which was the
abolition of the homeowner subsidy. One potential channel might be a substitution away
21Consumption taxes and VAT are, of course, distortionary.
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from home purchases to purchases of other durable goods. Using data from the German
Sample Survey of Income and Expenditure, we find a stable homeownership rate of 43.0%
in 2003, 43.2% in 2008, and 43.0% in 2013. A substitution away from home purchases to
purchases of other durable goods is therefore unlikely to explain our findings.
Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2016) argue uncertainty shocks could be a major
driver of business cycles. Higher uncertainty might result in lower consumption due to a
precautionary-savings motive. Using the policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and
Davis (2016), we do not see noticeable differences in uncertainty across Germany, France,
and the UK (see Figure A.4 in the online appendix).22 An increase in uncertainty occurs
in September 2005 in Germany, which was the month of the general election. During the
period of our difference-in-differences test, uncertainty is effectively flat across countries.23
An intratemporal substitution from non-durable to durable consumption without
increasing overall consumption might be another alternative channel we want to discuss.
Figure 8 plots the real durable and non-durable consumption growth at the quarterly
frequency. Real durable consumption growth increases sharply during 2006. However,
non-durable consumption growth also increases and is above historical averages during
this period. Table 6 shows households expecting higher inflation are more likely to report
it is a bad time to save compared to households with constant or decreasing inflation
expectations. Both sets of results make an intratemporal substitution channel driving
our findings unlikely.
F. Causal Effect of VAT Shock on Willingness to Buy Durables
We run a set of cross-sectional regressions on the matched sample before and after the
announcement of the VAT increase to estimate the average treatment effect of the VAT
shock in equation (2). We set the reference month to June 2005, and we change the end
month m across regressions. All the results are similar if we use any other month before
the announcement of the VAT increase in November 2005.
We estimate the following specification:
∆Duri, 06/2005→m = α + βm × V ATshocki + ∆X ′i, 06/2005→m × γ + i, (3)
22We thank Rudi Bachmann for suggesting we test for an uncertainty and policy confidence channel.
23Baker et al. (2016) do not provide uncertainty data for Sweden. All our results hold if we exclude
Sweden from the analysis.
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where ∆Duri, 06/2005→m is the difference in the willingness to spend on durable goods
between month m and June 2005, V ATshocki is an indicator equal to 1 if the household
was exposed to the VAT shock, βm captures the effect of the VAT shock on household
i’s willingness to buy durables in month m, and ∆X ′i,06/2005→m is the difference in a set
of observables between month m and the baseline month. The observables include the
matching variables we use to construct households pairs, as well as income expectations.
The results are virtually identical if we change the set of observables, or we exclude them
altogether.
Figure 9 plots the estimated coefficient βˆm (solid line) of equation (3) for each month
m from July 2005 to December 2007, as well as the 95% confidence intervals (dashed line).
We find no difference in the readiness to spend on durable goods between German and
matched households before the announcement of the VAT increase. Starting in December
2005, the VAT shock results in a positive effect on the willingness of German households
to purchase compared to matched households: German households are 3.8 percentage
points (s.e. 1.5 percentage points) more likely to declare it is a good time to purchase
durable goods after the announcement compared to before, and compared to matched
foreign households. The effect increases in magnitude throughout 2006 and peaks at
34 percentage points in November 2006. The average treatment effect drops to zero in
January 2007 once VAT increases and higher inflation materializes.24
Figure 9 shows the VAT shock has a strong and positive effect on the willingness
of German households to purchase durable goods after the announcement and before
the increase took effect, even after controlling for the purchasing propensities of similar
households not exposed to the shock in a difference-in-differences setting. The average
treatment effect increases over time. This finding is consistent with Crossley et al. (2014),
who argue intertemporal arbitrage should increase over time and be highest right before
the tax increase, because of irreversibility, uncertainty, and storage costs.
24Figure A.5 in the online appendix plots the average treatment effect of a specification in which we
match on income expectations for the next 12 months, in addition to gender, age, education, income, and
social status. Results are virtually identical.
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V Discussion
In this section, we describe in detail the narrative records surrounding the 2005 general
elections in Germany, and the relationship between willingness to spend and actual
spending, inflation expectations and actual inflation, the mapping of our findings into
the framework of Correia et al. (2013), the marginal effect of inflation expectations on
consumption expenditure over time, salience of VAT changes, and the differences between
reduced and full VAT rates.
2005 electoral campaign platforms and election outcome: The Christian
Democrats (CDU, center-right) were the only German party in the 2005 electoral
campaign advocating an increase in VAT by 2% starting in January 2006 to lower
non-wage labor costs (see CDU (2005), page 14). The Social Democrats (SPD, center-left)
strongly opposed an increase in VAT, and instead favored a 3% increase in income tax for
top income earners (see SPD (2005), page 39). The Greens (center-left) and Liberals
(center-right) also strongly opposed an increase in VAT. The Liberals, for example,
promised to decrease the general tax burden by EUR 19bn.
All parties except the CDU strongly opposed raising VAT, including CDU’s preferred
coalition partner, the Liberals. The projections of the election outcomes were highly
uncertain (see below), as well as the fiscal policy measures the new government would
have implemented. A VAT increase of 3% was therefore highly unexpected. Consistently,
the opposition parties and the popular press accused the new government between CDU
and SPD of electoral fraud after it announced this policy measure in November 2005, and
they fiercely criticized the new government. The online appendix contains press clippings
commenting on the VAT policy (see Section III of the online appendix).
Figure 2 is direct evidence that German households did not expect an increase in
VAT in 2006, as the CDU proposed: households’ inflation expectation over the next 12
months did not increase until January 2006, after the new government had announced
its plans in November 2005 to increase VAT in 2007, rather than 2006 as the CDU had
planned initially.25
Neither of the two blocks—CDU and Liberals on the one hand, and SPD and Greens
25If voters had considered the CDU proposal credible, we should already see an increase in inflation
expectation during the campaign in the summer of 2005, because the plan was to increase VAT in January
2006.
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on the other hand—had a majority in polls before the elections.26 In the actual election
on September 18, 2005, the CDU gained 35.2% electoral support; the SPD, 34.2%; the
Liberals, 9.8%; the Left, 8.7%; and the Greens, 8.1%. Neither the CDU nor the SPD
were able to form a “small” coalition with their preferred coalition partner (Liberals and
Greens, respectively). The CDU and SPD therefore agreed to form a “grand” coalition.
The coalition agreed on an overall contractionary fiscal policy (see below), including
the increase of VAT by 3%, and the use of one third of the additional tax revenue to
decrease non-wage labor costs by two percentage points. The government planned to
use two thirds of the VAT increase to consolidate the federal budget to comply with the
Maastricht Treaty and hinder an infringement procedure by the European Commission.
Table A.5 in the online appendix shows the total tax revenue indeed increased in 2007,
and Germany no longer violated the EU Stability and Growth Pact.
Other Policy Measures: The new government announced additional policy
measures as part of its coalition agreement. The preamble of the official agreement
emphasizes the need to reduce Germany’s public debt as the major challenge for the new
government, and the set of agreed-upon policy measures would be contractionary overall.
In addition to the VAT increase and the non-wage labor-costs reduction, the government
announced an investment program of 0.25% of 2005 GDP per year over the following four
years. The government planned to finance the majority of the program through budget
cuts. Moreover, the government announced an increase in the top marginal income tax
rate from 42% to 45% for incomes above EUR 250,000 for singles and EUR 500,000 for
couples. Lastly, the government planned to increase indirect taxes for retirement from
19.4% to 19.9%, and it abolished the home-buyer subsidy, which had been guaranteed since
1949, and amounted to EUR 11.4 billion in 2004.27 The overall contractionary nature of
this set of policies suggests our estimates in Section IV represent a lower bound of the
positive effect of the announcement to increase VAT in 2007 on households’ willingness
to purchase durables.
26Eleven days before the elections, the polling institute Infratest Dimap predicted a vote share of 41%
for the CDU, 34% for the SPD, 8.5% for the Left, 7% for the Greens, and 6.5% for the Liberals. See
http://www.infratest-dimap.de/en/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/sonntagsfrage/. All parties explicitly
ruled out any coalition with the Left. The media mentioned all other possible combinations, including
non-traditional combinations, as possible coalitions, including a “traffic-light” coalition among SPD,
Greens, and Liberals and a “Jamaica” coalition among CDU, Liberals, and Greens.
27See http://www.kas.de/upload/ACDP/CDU/Koalitionsvertraege/Koalitionsvertrag2005.pdf for de-
tails.
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Willingness to Spend versus Actual Spending: We are ultimately interested in
how inflation expectations transform into actual consumption expenditure. Our survey
only reports the willingness to purchase durable goods. Figure A.1 in the online appendix
is a scatter plot of the cyclical components of log real durable consumption expenditure
and the average propensity to purchase durables.28 Real and reported spending on
durables are positively related. Their correlation is 0.46.
The reported willingness to purchase has potential advantages compared to measures
of actual expenditures elicited with surveys. Spending data in surveys typically contain
noise, because survey participants might not recall their actual purchases, or they might
overstate their purchases of visible products, such as cars, and understate the consumption
of “sin” products, such as tobacco and alcohol (see Hurd and Rohwedder (2012) and
Atkinson and Micklewright (1983)).
Empirical Evidence and Relationship with Theory: Correia et al. (2013)
study theoretically unconventional fiscal policy and show it can fully circumvent the zero
lower bound constraint on nominal interest rates in a budget-neutral and time consistent
manner. Their benchmark model is a textbook New Keynesian model, in which labor
is the only factor of production. In this setup, an increasing path of consumption taxes
generates inflation expectations and negative real interest rates. Lower labor income
taxes ensure consumption taxes do not affect the intratemporal margin between leisure
and consumption, and hence the real wage. Firms’ pricing decisions are independent of
the change in consumption taxes, and marginal costs do not change either. Therefore, the
production allocation across firms is efficient and the government can offset the distortion
coming from monopoly rents with taxes as in the textbook model.
Our natural experiment is close to the theoretical framework in Correia et al. (2013),
but deviates in a few dimensions we now discuss. First, the German government used 2
percentage points of the increase in VAT by 3% to consolidate the federal budget, and 1
percentage point to lower indirect labor taxes by 2%.29 Empirically, we do not find any
28We use a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ of 1,600 to extract the cyclical
component.
29Efficiency gains in the unemployment insurance system financed the second percentage-point decrease
in indirect labor taxes.
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effect on labor supply or unit labor costs.30 Moreover, we find similar marginal effects
of inflation expectations on the propensity to purchase durables for full-time, part-time,
and unemployed survey participants (see appendix Table A.4). In addition, Nakamura,
Steinsson, Sun, and Villar (2016) question whether producer price dispersion has real
economic costs.
Second, we only observe attitudes towards purchases of durable goods. In a model
with both durable and non-durable consumption, the intertemporal substitution effect of
higher future consumption taxes is larger for durable goods (see Barsky et al. (2007) and
Barsky et al. (2016)).31 A potential concern for policymakers aiming to stimulate overall
consumption is that households might substitute intratemporally from non-durable to
durable consumption, because the VAT change did affect nondurable goods less than
durable goods (see discussion below). We do not observe households’ attitudes towards
purchases of non-durable goods. To address this concern directly, we show realized non-
durable consumption growth increased during 2006. German households also lowered
their savings attitudes during 2007 in absolute terms and relative to matched foreign
households, supporting the conclusion that households increased overall consumption
(see Table 6).
Third, Correia et al. (2013) study unconventional fiscal policies during a liquidity
trap, whereas we study the effect for a single country in a currency union. To predict
higher consumption, the consumption Euler equation requires only that nominal interest
rates not be increasing sufficiently to offset the increase in inflation expectations rather
than being in a liquidity trap. The ECB explicitly excluded an increase in nominal interest
rates to counteract the announcement of a higher VAT in Germany, because it believed
the increase in consumer price inflation would be temporary and limited to Germany. The
then-president of the German Bundesbank excluded an increase in nominal rates to offset
inflationary pressure: “We know what the effects of the VAT increase are; as is the case
for oil prices, we do not consider one-off effects” (see Weber (2006)). Nominal interest
30Data from the OECD show unit labor costs decreased in Germany during
2006 and 2007 in absolute terms and relative to France, Sweden, and the UK
(see: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?QueryName=426). Labor force participa-
tion, instead, slightly increased from 58.4% in 2005 to 59.1% in 2007 (see:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.ZS?locations=DE).
31Shapiro (1991) already emphasizes the effect of unconventional fiscal policy should mainly operate
through expenditure on durable goods. Storability of durable goods can lead to an increase in durable
expenditure due to a future increases in VAT even if the IES is small through an arbitrage effect.
25
rates for consumption loans also barely changed and were 6.7% in January 2006 and 6.4%
in December 2007 (see appendix Figure A.2). Moreover, in our difference-in-differences
estimation in Section IV, we compare the behavior of German households to matched
French households that face the same nominal interest rates as German households.
Last, we study the pre-announced increase in VAT rather than consumption taxes.
Correia et al. (2013) already highlight both VAT and consumption taxes should have
similar implications because of “the extensive evidence of very high pass-through of
consumption taxes even in the cases in which the usual practice is to quote after-tax
prices, as is the case for the value-added tax in Europe.” This point is consistent with the
ex-ante expectations for the specific case of the VAT increase in Germany and the actual
ex-post result. The Association of Consumer & Home Electronics expected the increase
in VAT would be fully passed through to consumers (see Stehle (2006)). Ex-post, the
German statistical office shows some categories immediately and fully adjusted prices,
such as tobacco and services, whereas other categories adjusted prices with a delay, such
as electronics and furniture. By early 2008, all categories underlying the German CPI
had fully adjusted their prices by the theoretical amount.32
Marginal Effect over Time: In Figure 2, we see a large increase in inflation
expectations before the introduction of the euro in 2002, and after the announcement and
before the actual increase in VAT in January of 2007. To ensure these two periods do
not drive our baseline results in Table 2, we plot in Figure A.6 in the online appendix the
marginal effect over time. We find a positive and statistically significant marginal effect of
6% throughout the sample period, which increases to 19% during our natural experiment
(see also Table A.2 in the online appendix).
Salience of VAT Changes: Pre-announced VAT increases are a salient way
to generate future consumer price inflation and induce current spending compared to
conventional and unconventional monetary policy or future government purchases. Menz
and Poppitz (2013) study the media coverage of inflation in Germany during the time
period of our natural experiment and document a surge in coverage of inflation. The
salience of consumption taxes could be an advantage of using taxes to engineer negative
real interest rates compared to forward guidance or announcements of future government
purchases.
Reduced and Full VAT Tax: All services and products in Germany are subject
32See https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/WirtschaftStatistik/Preise/MwSterhoehungJan2007.pdf.
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to a value-added tax that is part of the European VAT system. The general tax rate was
16% until December 2006, and increased to 19% in 2007. A reduced rate of 7% applies
to many convenience goods, such as food, books, or flowers. The reduced rate has been
unchanged since 1983. Rent, services for non-profit organizations, and medical expenses
are not subject to VAT. Virtually all durable goods are subject to the full VAT, whereas
only 59% of non-durables are subject to a VAT rate of 19%.
VI Concluding Remarks
We propose a causal test for the effect of unconventional fiscal policies on households’
consumption attitudes. We test for the effect of a pre-announced increase in value added
tax (VAT) on the willingness of households to buy durable goods through an inflation-
expectations channel.
The natural experiment we exploit for identification—an announcement in 2005 to
increase German VAT in 2007—is unique because the increase was unexpected, and the
EU imposed it to comply with its budgetary requirements. It was exogenous to the
expectations of German households. Moreover, the European Central Bank explicitly
stated it would not increase nominal interest rates to combat an expected increase in
inflation, which it considered temporary and locally confined.
We use observationally similar households in other European countries not exposed
to the VAT shock as a counterfactual in a difference-in-differences identification design.
The announcement of an increase in VAT led to an increase in German households’
inflation expectations and in their willingness to buy durable goods, compared to
households in other European countries exposed to the same macroeconomic environment
but not exposed to the VAT shock. The announcement did not change households’
expectations regarding future income, suggesting income effects do not drive our findings.
We find an intratemporal substitution channel from non-durable to durable goods, wealth
effects, redistribution through inflation, political uncertainty, or a housing wealth channel
are unlikely explanations for the effect of the VAT shock on spending attitudes.
Our results suggest budget-neutral unconventional fiscal policies can be a viable
alternative to unconventional monetary and conventional fiscal policy to stimulate
aggregate demand, especially in times of large government budget deficits and inflated
central bank balance sheets. Unconventional fiscal policy is salient, budget neutral, and
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affects the whole population. Governments can change VAT in a timely manner, which
are further advantages compared to income tax rebates or direct payments to households.
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Figure 2: Expected Increase in Inflation and Average Readiness to Spend on
Durables
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This figure plots average monthly inflation expectation (blue line, left y-axis) and the average monthly
readiness to purchase durables (green dashed line, right y-axis) over time. We use the confidential micro data
underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative
sample of 2,000 households how consumer prices will evolve in the next twelve months compared to the
previous twelve months and whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic
conditions. We create a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household expects inflation to increase. Higher
values correspond to better times to purchase durables. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013
for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure 3: Standardized Lagged Inflation Expectations and Durable Inflation
Rate
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Standardized Lagged Inflation Expectations
Standardized Durable Inflation
This figure plots the monthly time series of the one-year lagged standardized average monthly inflation
expectation and the harmonized major durables consumer price inflation rate in percent at an annual rate. We
use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct inflation
expectations. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households how consumer prices will evolve in the
next twelve months compared to the previous twelve months. We create a dummy variable which equals 1
when a household expects inflation to increase. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a
total of fourteen years.
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Figure 4: Expected Increase in Inflation: Germany and European Union
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This figure plots average monthly inflation expectation over time. We use the confidential micro data
underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct the variables for Germany and similar data
from national statistical agencies and GfK subsidiaries for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and France. GfK
asks a representative sample of 2,000 households how consumer prices will evolve in the next twelve months
compared to the previous twelve months. We create a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household
expects inflation to increase. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2006 for a total of three years.
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Figure 5: Readiness to Spend on Durables: Germany and European Union
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This figure plots the average monthly readiness to purchase durables over time. We use the confidential micro
data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct these variables for Germany and
similar data from national statistical agencies and GfK subsidiaries for the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
France. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households whether it is a good time to purchase durables
given the current economic conditions. Higher values correspond to better times to purchase durables. The
sample period is January 2004 to December 2006 for a total of three years.
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Figure 6: Common Support of Treated and Matched Households
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This figure plots the number of households in the untreated (blue) and treated (red) group across forty
equal-length partitions of the distribution of the propensity score in the baseline month (June 2005) for the
difference-in-differences analysis. We estimate the propensity score with a logit specification whose outcome
variable is the indicator for whether a household is in the treated or control group, and the controls are the
observables we use for the matching of households: age group, gender, education group, income group, and
social status group. The treated group includes 1,431 German households, whereas the control group includes
5,108 households from the UK, France, and Sweden.
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Figure 7: Household Expectations
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Income Expectations
This figure plots average monthly inflation expectation, perception of past income, and expectation of future
income over time. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey
to construct those variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households how consumer prices
will evolve in the next twelve months compared to the previous twelve months, how the financial situation of
the household evolved during the past twelve months, and how the financial situation of the household will
evolve during the next twelve months. We create a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household expects
inflation to increase, perceives an improved financial situation, and expects an improved financial situation.
The sample period is January 2004 to December 2006 for a total of three years.
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Figure 8: Real Aggregate Consumption Growth
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This figure plots real durable (blue dashed line, left y-axis) and non-durable (green line, right y-axis)
consumption growth at the quarterly frequency from the German statistical office Destatis. The sample
period is the first quarter of 2000 to the fourth quarter of December 2013 for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure 9: Change in the Readiness to Spend on Durables for German vs.
Foreign Households
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This figure plots βm coefficient (solid line) of ∆Duri,06/2005→m = α+βm×V ATshocki+∆X ′i,06/2005→m×γ+
i and two standard deviation error bands (dashed line). ∆Duri,06/2005→m is the difference in the willingness
to spend on durable goods between month m and June 2005, V ATshocki is an indicator which equals 1 if
the household was exposed to the VAT shock, βm captures the effect of the VAT shock on the willingness
to buy durables for household i in month m, and ∆X ′i,06/2005→m is the difference in a set of observables
between month m and the baseline month. We use the micro data underlying the Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission harmonized consumer surveys to construct
these variables.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports descriptive statistics for households’ inflation expectations and readiness to purchase durables
in Panel A, household demographics in Panel B, household expectations and perceptions in Panel C, and
macroeconomics aggregates in Panel D. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate
survey to measure the variables in Panel A to Panel C. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households
questions about general economic expectations, income expectations, and willingness to buy in order to create an
aggregate measure labeled “consumer climate.” For Panel A, GfK asks whether it is a good time to purchase durables
given the current economic conditions. GfK also asks how consumer prices will evolve in the next twelve months
compared to the previous twelve months. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household
replies that inflation will increase. GfK also asks how consumer prices evolved in the previous twelve months. See
the online appendix for data sources and detailed data definitions. The sample period is January 2000 to December
2013.
Nobs Mean Std Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Panel A: Inflation expectations and readiness to spend
Readiness to buy durables Good time 326,011 20.26%
Neither 56.15%
Bad time 23.59%
Inflation increase 355,400 13.77% 0.34 0 0 0 0 1
Inflation perception increased substantially 348,521 28.06%
increased somewhat 29.69%
increased slightly 27.80%
remained the same 13.23%
decreased 1.23%
Panel B: Household demographics
Sex Male 355,400 53.83%
Female 46.17%
Age 355,400 46.07 17.49 14 33 45 60 99
Education Hauptschule 350,093 42.74%
Realschule 38.96%
Gymnasium 10.34%
Universitaet 7.97%
Household members 355,400 2.49 1.17 1 2 2 3 5
City City<9,999 355,400 28.24%
9,999<=City<49,999 34.46%
50,000<=City<199,999 15.66%
199,999<=City 21.64%
Kids at home yes 355,400 26.88%
no 73.12%
Number of kids 352,256 0.42 0.78 0 0 0 1 4
Net income (inc) inc< 1,000 270,592 43.60%
1,000<=inc<1,500 28.66%
1,500<=inc<2,500 20.81%
2,500<=inc 6.93%
Panel C: Household expectations and perceptions
Past Financial situation Improved substantially 351,486 0.02
Improved somewhat 0.12
Identical 0.61
Worsened somewhat 0.21
Worsened substantially 0.05
Financial outlook Improves substantially 341,105 0.01
Improves somewhat 0.11
Identical 0.73
Worsens somewhat 0.13
Worsens substantially 0.02
Current financial situation Save a lot 345,683 0.04
Save little 0.39
Don’t save 0.41
Dissave 0.13
Take on debt 0.02
Expected unemployment rate Increases substantially 342,563 14.10
Increases somewhat 32.24
Identical 35.28
Decreases somewhat 17.27
Decreases a lot 1.12
continued on next page
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics continued
Continued from previous page.
Nobs Mean Std Min p25 p50 p75 Max
Panel D: Macroeconomic aggregates
CPI Inflation 355,400 1.61% 0.65% −0.50% 1.21% 1.64% 1.98% 3.27%
Unemployment rate 355,400 8.99 1.61 6.40 7.60 9.00 10.30 12.70
European Uncertainty Index 355,400 134.25 62.78 46.61 83.54 116.53 170.93 331.54
German Uncertainty Index 355,400 119.79 57.60 28.43 79.13 106.68 144.33 377.84
MRO rate 355,400 3.09 1.53 0.25 1.00 4.25 4.25 4.25
Dax 355,400 5840 1511 2424 4769 5970 6949 9552
Volatility DAX 355,400 22.79 8.67 11.24 16.88 20.62 25.91 57.96
Industrial Production Growth 355,400 1.60% 6.97% −27.25% 0.00% 2.41% 5.65% 14.55%
Oil Price 355,400 63.42 33.66 18.71 29.80 58.76 94.99 132.72Table 2: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: Baseline
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Households’ readiness to purchase
durables is the dependent variable. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household
replies that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of the increase in consumer
prices during the last twelve months. We also control for household demographics, household expectations, and
contemporaneous macroeconomic variables where indicated. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK
Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households
on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Households
can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. Standard errors are
clustered at the quarter level (56 clusters). The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inflation expectation 0.0624∗∗∗ 0.0749∗∗∗ 0.0755∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0875∗∗∗
(0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0116)
Past Inflation −0.0342∗∗∗ −0.0300∗∗∗ −0.0200∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0023)
Demographics X X X
Individual expectations X X
Macro aggregates X
Pseudo R2 0.0031 0.0161 0.0292 0.0654 0.0762
Nobs 326,011 321,496 244,497 219,799 219,799
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 4: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: matched sample
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Households’ readiness to purchase
durables is the dependent variable. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household replies
that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of the increase in consumer prices
during the last twelve months. We use the confidential micro data underlying the Directorate-General for Economic
and Financial Affairs of the European Commission harmonized consumer surveys to construct these variables. The
surveys ask representative samples of households on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables
given the current economic conditions. Households can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither
a good time nor a bad time. In this table we study the “it is a good time” outcome. Standard errors are clustered
at the quarter level. The sample period is January 2004 to December 2012 for France, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom. The sample period is January 2004 to October 2005 and January 2007 to December 2012. We use the
longest sample for which we have data on all countries.
Germany excl
France Sweden UK VAT period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inflation expectation 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗ 0.0555∗∗∗
(0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0067) (0.0037)
Past Inflation −0.0163∗∗∗ −0.0438∗∗∗ −0.0294∗∗∗ −0.0140∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0051) (0.0019) (0.0039)
Demographics X X X X
Individual expectations X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0445 0.0317 0.0446 0.0641
Nobs 163,419 141,903 87,864 125,407
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Balancing of Variables - German and Foreign Households (June 2005)
This table describes the balancing of the observables we use to match treated and control households in the baseline
month (June 2005) for the difference-in-differences analysis. For each variable, the first column reports the mean
within the pool of control households (UK, France, and Sweden). The second column reports the mean within the
pool of treated German households. The third and fourth column report the results for a two-sided t-test whose null
hypothesis is that the means across groups are equal. The two pools are constituted by 1,431 households (treated)
and 5,108 households (control) that overlap on the same common support.
Variable Mean Control Mean Treated t-stat p-value
Age (four groups) 2.33 2.30 1.01 0.31
Male 0.47 0.47 0.22 0.82
Education (three groups) 1.77 1.81 -1.15 0.25
Income (four quartiles) 2.31 2.28 0.8 0.42
Social Status (three groups) 2.60 2.61 -0.37 0.71
Obs in common support 5,108 1,431
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Table 6: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Save
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression. Households’ readiness to save
is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a households replies
that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of the increase in consumer prices
during the last twelve months. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate survey
to construct these variables. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013.
Not at all Not really Good time
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation increase 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗ 0.0006
(0.0016) (0.0036) (0.0082)
Past Inflation 0.0019∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0045)
Demographics X X X
Individual expectations X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0203
Nobs 234,522
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Online Appendix:
Inflation Expectations and Consumption Expenditure
Francesco D’Acunto, Daniel Hoang, and Michael Weber
Not for Publication
I Survey Questions
Below we report the original survey questions with answer choices for Germany, the
English translation, and the harmonized surveys from the Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission harmonized consumer
surveys used in Section IV for the matching estimator.
A. Germany
Question 1 Wie hat sich Ihrer Meinung nach die ”allgemeine Wirtschaftslage” in
Deutschland in den letzten 12 Monaten entwickelt?
Sie ...
• hat sich wesentlich verbessert
• hat sich etwas verbessert
• ist in etwa gleich geblieben
• hat sich etwas verschlechtert
• hat sich wesentlich verschlechtert
• weiss nicht
Question 2 Wie haben sich Ihrer Ansicht nach die Verbraucherpreise in den letzten
12 Monaten entwickelt?
Sie sind ...
• stark gestiegen
• in Massen gestiegen
• leicht gestiegen
• in etwa gleich geblieben
• gesunken
• weiss nicht
Question 3 Wie werden sich Ihrer Ansicht nach die Verbraucherpreise in den
kommenden 12 Monaten im Vergleich zu den letzten 12 Monaten
entwickeln?
Sie werden ...
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• staerker als bisher steigen
• etwa im gleichen Masse wie bisher steigen
• weniger stark als bisher steigen
• in etwa gleich bleiben
• gesunken
• weiss nicht
Question 4 Wie hat sich die finanzielle Lage Ihres Haushaltes in den letzten 12
Monaten entwickelt?
Sie ...
• hat sich wesentlich verbessert
• hat sich etwas verbessert
• ist in etwa gleichgeblieben
• hat sich etwas verschlechtert
• hat sich wesentlich verschlechtert
• weiss nicht
Question 5 Wie wird sich Ihrer Ansicht nach die finanzielle Lage Ihres Haushaltes
in den kommenden 12 Monaten entwickeln?
Sie wird ...
• sich wesentlich verbessern
• sich etwas verbessern
• in etwa gleichbleiben
• sich etwas verschlechtern
• sich wesentlich verschlechtern
• weiss nicht
Question 6 Wie wird sich Ihrer Ansicht nach die allgemeine Wirtschaftslage in
Deutschland in den kommenden 12 Monaten entwickeln?
Sie wird ...
• sich wesentlich verbessern
• sich etwas verbessern
• in etwa gleichbleiben
• sich etwas verschlechtern
• sich wesentlich verschlechtern
• weiss nicht
Question 7 Wie ist die derzeitige finanzielle Lage Ihres Haushaltes?
• wir sparen viel
• wir sparen ein wenig
• wir kommen mit unseren finanziellen Mitteln so gerade aus
• wir greifen etwas unsere Ersparnisse an
• wir verschulden uns
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• weiss nicht
Question 8 Glauben Sie, dass es in Anbetracht der allgemeinen Wirtschaft-
slage derzeit guenstig ist, groessere Anschaffungen (Moebel, elek-
trische/elektronische Geraete usw.) zu taetigen?
• ja, jetzt der Augenblick ist guenstig
• der Augenblick ist weder besonders guenstig noch besonders unguenstig
• nein, der Augenblick ist nicht guenstig
• weiss nicht
Question 10 Wie wird sich Ihrer Ansicht nach die Zahl der Arbeitslosen in Deutsch-
land in den kommenden 12 Monaten entwickeln?
Die Zahl wird ...
• stark steigen
• leicht steigen
• in etwa gleich bleiben
• leicht zurueckgehen
• stark zurueckgehen
• weiss nicht
Question 11 Wollen Sie in den kommenden 12 Monaten fuer groessere Anschaffungen
(Moebel, elektrische /elektronische Geraete usw.) mehr oder weniger
ausgeben als in den letzten 12 Monaten?
Ich werde ...
• wesentlich mehr ausgeben
• etwas mehr ausgeben
• in etwa gleich viel ausgeben
• etwas weniger ausgeben
• wesentlich weniger ausgeben
• weiss nicht
Question 12 Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie in den kommenden 12 Monaten Geld
sparen werden?
• sehr wahrscheinlich
• recht wahrscheinlich
• unwahrscheinlich
• sehr unwahrscheinlich
• weiss nicht
Question 13 Glauben Sie, dass es in Anbetracht der allgemeinen Wirtschaftslage
derzeit ratsam ist, zu sparen?
• ja, auf alle Faelle
• wahrscheinlich ja
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• eher nicht
• auf keinen Fall
• weiss nicht
Question 1 How did you perceive the general economic situation in Germany over
the last 12 months?
It ...
• improved substantially
• improved somewhat
• remained about the same
• worsened somewhat
• worsened substantially
• don’t know
Question 2 What is your perception on how consumer prices evolved during the last
12 months?
They ...
• increased substantially
• increased somewhat
• increased slightly
• remained about the same
• decreased
• don’t know
Question 3 How will consumer prices evolve during the next 12 months compared to
the previous 12 months?
They will ...
• increase more
• increase the same
• increase less
• stay the same
• decrease
• don’t know
Question 4 How did the financial situation of your household evolve during the past
12 months?
It ...
• improved substantially
• improved somewhat
• remained about the same
• worsened somewhat
• worsened substantially
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• don’t know
Question 5 How will the financial situation of your household evolve during the next
12 months?
It will ...
• improve substantially
• improve somewhat
• remain the same
• worsen slightly
• worsen substantially
• don’t know
Question 6 How will the general economic situation in Germany evolve during the
next 12 months?
It will ...
• improve substantially
• improve slightly
• remain the same
• worsen slightly
• worsen substantially
• don’t know
Question 7 What is the current financial situation of your household?
• we save a lot
• we save a bit
• we just manage to live from our financial inflows and don’t save
• we have to de-save
• we become indebted
• don’t know
Question 8 Given the current economic situation, do you think it’s a good time to
buy larger items such as furniture, electronic items etc?
• yes, it’s a good time
• the time is neither good nor bad
• no, it’s a bad time
• don’t know
Question 10 What is your expectation regarding the number of unemployed people in
Germany in the next 12 months?
It will ...
• increase substantially
• increase somewhat
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• remain the same
• decrease somewhat
• decrease a lot
• don’t know
Question 11 Do you plan to spend more money during the next 12 months on larger
items such as furniture, electronics, etc compared to the previous 12
months?
I will ...
• spend substantially more
• spend somewhat more
• spend about the same
• spend somewhat less
• spend substantially less
• don’t know
Question 12 How likely is it that you will save money during the next 12 months?
• very likely
• quite likely
• unlikely
• very unlikely
• don’t know
Question 13 Given the current economic situation, do you think it’s a good time to
save right now?
• yes, it’s a good time
• probably yes
• not really
• not at all
• don’t know
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B. France
Question 1 A votre avis, au cours des douze derniers mois, la situation e´conomique
ge´ne´rale de la France ...
• s’est nettement ame´liore´e
• s’est un peu ame´liore´e
• est reste´e stationnaire
• s’est un peu de´grade´e
• s’est nettement de´grade´e
• ne sait pas
Question 2 A votre avis, au cours des douze prochains mois, la situation e´conomique
ge´ne´rale de la France ...
• va nettement s’ame´liorer
• va un peu s’ame´liorer
• va rester stationnaire
• va un peu se de´grader
• va nettement se de´grader
• ne sait pas
Question 3 Pensez-vous que, dans les douze prochains mois, le nombre de choˆmeurs
va ...
• fortement augmenter
• un peu augmenter
• rester stationnaire
• un peu diminuer
• fortement diminue
• ne sait pas
Question 4 Trouvez-vous que, au cours des douze derniers mois, les prix ont ...
• fortement augmente´
• moyennement augmente´
• un peu augmente´
• stagne´
• diminue´
• ne sait pas
Question 5 Par rapport aux douze derniers mois, quelle sera A˜ votre avis l’e´volution
des prix au cours des douze prochains mois?
• elle va eˆtre plus rapide
• elle va se poursuivre au meˆme rythme
• elle va eˆtre moins rapide
• les prix vont rester stationnaires
• les prix vont diminuer
• ne sait pas
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Question 6 Dans la situation e´conomique actuelle, pensez-vous que les gens aient
inte´reˆt a` faire des achats importants? (meubles, machines a` laver,
mate´riels e´lectroniques ou informatiques ...)
• oui, le moment est plutoˆt favorable
• le moment n’est ni favorable ni de´favorable ...
• non, le moment est plutA˜´t de´favorable
• ne sait pas
Question 7 Dans la situation e´conomique actuelle, pensez-vous que ce soit le bon
moment pour e´pargner?
• oui, certainement
• oui, peut-e`tre
• non, probablement pas
• non, certainement pas
• ne sait pas
Question 8 A votre avis, au cours des douze derniers mois, le niveau de vie en France,
dans l’ensemble s’est ...
• nettement ame´liore´
• un peu ame´liore´
• reste´e stationnaire
• un peu de´grade´
• nettement de´grade´
• ne sait pas
Question 9 A votre avis, au cours des douze prochains mois, le niveau de vie en
France, dans l’ensemble va ...
• nettement s’ame´liorer
• s’ame´liorer un peu
• rester stationnaire
• se de´grader un peu
• nettement se de´grader
• ne sait pas
Question 10 Laquelle des affirmations suivantes vous semble de´crire le mieux la
situation financie`re actuelle de votre foyer?
• vous arrivez a` mettre pas mal d’argent de co`te´
• vous arrivez a` mettre un peu d’argent de co`te´
• vous bouclez juste votre budget
• vous tirez un peu sur vos re´serves
• vous e`tes en train de vous endetter
• ne sait pas
Question 11 Au cours des douze derniers mois, la situation financie`re de votre foyer
s’est ...
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• nettement ame´liore´e
• un peu ame´liore´e
• reste´e stationnaire
• un peu de´grade´e
• un peu de´grade´e
• ne sait pas
Question 12 Pensez-vous que, au cours des douze prochains mois, la situation
financie`re de votre Foyer va ...
• nettement s’ame´liorer
• un peu s’ame´liorer
• rester stationnaire
• un peu se de´grader
• nettement se de´grader
• ne sait pas
Question 13 Pensez-vous re´ussir a` mettre de l’argent de coˆte´ au cours des douze
prochains mois?
• oui, certainement
• oui, peut-eˆtre
• non, probablement pas
• non, certainement pas
• ne sait pas
Question 14 Au cours des douze prochains mois, par rapport aux douze mois passe´s,
avez-vous l’intention de de´penser, pour effectuer des achats importants
...
• beaucoup plus
• un peu plus
• autant
• un peu moins
• beaucoup moins
• ne sait pas
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C. Sweden
Question 1 Hur ar ditt hushalls ekonomiska situation for narvarande jamfort med
for 12 manader sedan? Ar den ...
• Mycket battre
• Nagot battre
• Ungefar lika
• Nagot samre
• Mycket samre
• Vet inte
Question 2 Hur tror du att ditt hushalls ekonomiska situation ar om 12 manader?
Ar den ...
• Mycket battre
• Nagot battre
• Ungefar lika
• Nagot samre
• Mycket samre
• Vet inte
Question 3 Hur tycker du att den ekonomiska situationen ar i Sverige for narvarande
jamfort med for 12 manader sedan? Ar den ...
• Mycket battre
• Nagot battre
• Ungefar lika
• Nagot samre
• Mycket samre
• Vet inte
Question 4 Hur tror du att den ekonomiska situationen ar i Sverige om 12 manader?
Ar den...
• Mycket battre
• Nagot battre
• Ungefar lika
• Nagot samre
• Mycket samre
• Vet inte
Question 5 Jamfort med for 12 manader sedan, tycker du att priserna i allmanhet
for narvarande ar...
• Mycket hogre
• Ganska mycket hogre
• Nagot hogre
• Ungefar desamma
• Lagre
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• Vet inte
Question 6 Om du jamfor med dagens situation, tror du att priserna i allmanhet om
12 manader kommer att ...
• Stiga snabbare
• Stiga i samma takt
• Stiga langsammare
• Vara i stort sett oforandrade
• Sjunka nagot
• Vet inte
Question 7 Hur tror du att arbetslosheten kommer att utvecklas under de narmaste
12 manaderna? Kommer den att ...
• Oka mycket
• Oka nagot
• Vara ungefar som nu
• Minska nagot
• Minska mycket
• Vet inte
Question 8 Har risken for att Du sjalv ska bli arbetslos under de senaste 12
manaderna ...?
• Oka mycket
• Oka nagot
• Vara ungefar som nu
• Minska nagot
• Minska mycket
• Vet inte
Question 9 Tycker du att det i dagslaget ar fordelaktigt for folk i allmanhet att gora
stora inkop, som exempelvis mabler, tvattmaskiner, TV osv.?
• Ja, det ar ratt tidpunkt
• Varken ratt eller fel tidpunkt
• Nej, det ar fel tidpunkt, inkapet bar ske senare
• Vet inte
Question 10 Hur mycket pengar tror du att ditt hushall kommer att anvanda till inkop
av sadana kapitalvaror under de narmaste 12 manaderna jamfort med de
senaste 12 manaderna? Blir det ...
• Mycket mer
• Nagot mer
• Ungefar lika mycket
• Nagot mindre
• Mycket mindre
• Vet inte
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Question 11 Mot bakgrund av det allmanna ekonomiska laget, hur tycker du att det
ar att spara for narvarande? Som sparande raknas aven minskning av
eventuella lan. Ar det...
• Mycket fordelaktigt
• Ganska fordelaktigt
• Varken fordelaktigt eller ofordelaktigt
• Ganska ofordelaktigt
• Mycket ofordelaktigt
• Vet inte
Question 12 Hur troligt ar det att Ditt hushall kommer att kunna spara nagot under
de narmaste 12 manaderna? Som sparande raknas aven minskning av
eventuella lan. Ar det ...?
• Mycket troligt
• Ganska troligt
• Inte sarskilt troligt
• Inte alls troligt
• Vet inte
Question 13 Vilket av faljande pastaenden beskriver bast ditt hushalls nuvarande
ekonomiska situation?
• Vi skuldsatter oss och/ eller utnyttjar sparade medel i stor utstrackning
• Vi skuldsatter oss och/ eller utnyttjar sparade medel
• Vi gar ungefar jamnt upp
• Vi sparar nagot
• Vi sparar mycket
• Vet inte
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D. United Kingdom
Question 1 How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last
12 months?
It has ...
• Got a lot better
• Got a little better
• Stayed the same
• Got a little worse
• Got a lot worse
• Don’t Know
Question 2 How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over
the next 12 months?
It will ...
• Get a lot better
• Get a little better
• Stay the same
• Get a little worse
• Get a lot worse
• Don’t Know
Question 3 How do you think the general economic situation in this country has
changed over the past 12 months?
It has ...
• Got a lot better
• Got a little better
• Stayed the same
• Got a little worse
• Got a lot worse
• Don’t Know
Question 4 How do you expect the general economic situation in this country to
develop over the next 12 months?
It will ...
• Get a lot better
• Get a little better
• Stay the same
• Get a little worse
• Get a lot worse
• Don’t Know
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Question 5 How do you think consumer prices have developed over the last 12
months?
They have ...
• Risen a lot
• Risen moderately
• Risen slightly
• Stayed about the same
• Fallen
• Don’t Know
Question 6 In comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect consumer
prices will develop in the next 12 months?
They will ...
• Increase more rapidly
• Increase at the same rate
• Increase at a slower rate
• Stay about the same
• Fall
• Don’t Know
Question 7 How do you expect the number of people unemployed in this country will
change over the next 12 months?
The number will ...
• Increase sharply
• Increase slightly
• Remain the same
• Fall slightly
• Fall sharply
• Don’t Know
Question 8 In view of the general economic situation, do you think now is the right
time for people to make major purchases such as furniture or electrical
goods?
• Yes, now is the right time
• It is neither the right time nor the wrong time
• No, it is the wrong time
• Don’t Know
Question 9 Compared to the last 12 months, do you expect to spend more or less
money on major purchases such as furniture and electrical goods?
I will spend ...
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• Much more
• A little more
• About the same
• A little less
• Much less
• Don’t Know
Question 10 In view of the general economic situation, do you think that now is?
• A very good time to save
• A fairly good time to save
• Not a good time to save
• A very bad time to save
• Don’t Know
Question 11 Over the next 12 months, how likely will you be to save any money?
• Very likely
• Fairly likely
• Not likely
• Not at all likely
• Don’t Know
Question 12 Which of these statements best describes the current financial situation
of your household?
• We are saving a lot
• We are saving a little
• We are just managing to make ends meet on our income
• We are having to draw on our savings
• We are running into debt
• Don’t Know
II Data
When conducting the survey, GfK also collects a rich set of demographics. We enlist the
variables below, and report the possible values the variables obtained in the sample in
parentheses.
Sex (male, female), age (continuous), household size (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
more), city size (06size61,999, 2,0006size62,999, 3,0006size64,999, 5,0006size69,999,
10,0006size619,999, 20,0006size649,999, 50,0006size699,999, 100,0006size6199,999,
200,0006size6499,999, 500,0006size), marital status (single, couple, married, widowed,
divorced, separated), children at home (yes, no), number of children (1, 2, 3,
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4 and more), homeownership (house owner, apartment owner, renter), household
head (yes, no), education (Hauptschule, Realschule, Gymnasium, University), em-
ployment (full-time, part-time, not employed), state (Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg,
Bremen, Berlin(West), Niedersachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz,
Saarland, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bayern, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen-Anhalt,
Brandenburg, Thueringen, Sachsen, Berlin(Ost)), monthly net income (inc) (inc6500,
500<inc6750, 750<inc61,000, 1,000<inc61,2500, 1,2500<inc61,500, 1,500<inc62,000,
2,000<inc62,500, 2,500<inc63,000, 3,000<inc63,500, 3,500<inc64,000, 4,000<inc), job
(farmer, liberal profession, self-employed, civil servant, white-collar worker, blue-collar
worker, student, trainee, draftee, housewife, retiree, unemployed).
Data on the consumer price index, the unemployment rate, real durable consumption
expenditure, real GDP, and industrial production are from the German Statistical Office
(DeStatis); data on the European and German uncertainty index are from Baker et al.
(2016); data on DAX and Volatility DAX are from the Deutsche Boerse; and oil price
data are from Bloomberg.
We obtain the harmonized consumer price indexes (CPI) from the Statistical Data
Warehouse at the European Central Bank. The data ID for the harmonized overall
CPI is ICP.M.DE.N.000000.4.INX; for the all items CPI excluding food and energy it is
ICP.M.DE.N.XEF000.4.INX; for the major durables CPI it is ICP.M.DE.N.0921 2.4.INX;
and for the non-durable households goods CPI it is ICP.M.DE.N.056100.4.INX.
We obtain data for bank interest rates for loans to households in Germany for
consumption from the Statistical Data Warehouse at the European Central Bank. The
data ID is MIR.M.DE.B.A2B.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N. The rate is the annualized agreed rate,
narrowly defined effective rate, for new loans for consumption excluding revolving loans
and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt.
Inflation expectations data for European Union member countries are from the
European Commission Directorate on Economic and Financial Affairs.
Consensus forecasts of the one-year ahead the German consumer price inflation rate
in percent at an annual rate are from Consensus Economics. The company surveys over
250 financial and economic professional forecasters for different macroeconomic variables
such as future growth, inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates.
The ZEW Financial Market Experts Inflation Forecast Index is from the Center of
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European Economic Research (ZEW). ZEW Financial Market Survey is a monthly survey
among 350 financial analysts and institutional investors in Germany. The survey asks
participants about their six-month expectations concerning the economy, inflation rates,
interest rates, stock markets, and exchange rates in Germany and other countries. The
index is the difference between the fraction of surveyed financial experts which expect
inflation to increase over the next six months minus the fraction of surveyed financial
experts which expect inflation to decrease in percent.
The ECB Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is a quarterly survey of
expectations for the rates of inflation, real GDP growth, and unemployment in the euro
area for several horizons. The participants to the Survey of Professional Forecasters are
experts affiliated with financial or non-financial institutions based within the European
Union.
III Press Clippings
We briefly cite a few media quotes following the announcement of the newly-elected
administration in 2005 to increase VAT by 3%.
“Mehrwertsteuer ist glatter Betrug an den Waehler.” Gruenen-Vorsitzende Claudia
Roth haelt den Koalitionsvertrag fuer unsozial
“VAT is electoral fraud.” Green party leader Claudia Roth calls coalition agreement
antisocial
Berliner Morgenpost, 11/21/2005
Opposition kritisiert“Wahlbetrug.” Vor allem hoehere Mehrwertsteuer stoesst auf Protest
Opposition criticizes “electoral fraud.” Especially higher VAT fiercely criticized
Frankfurter Rundschau, 11/14/2005
Opposition spricht von Wahlbetrug.
Opposition stresses “electoral fraud.”
Die Welt, 11/13/2005
Die dreissten Steuerluegen.
Unapologetic tax lies.
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Berliner Morgenpost, 5/19/2006
Westerwelle geisselt Steuererhoehungen.
Westerwelle criticizes tax hike.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 5/15/2006
Warum luegen Politiker?
Why do politician lie?
Welt am Sonntag, 5/14/2006
IV Additional Results
This section reports additional tests and robustness checks.
Figure A.5 plots the average treatment effect of the VAT increase on the readiness
to buy durables, like Figure 9, but it also matches German and foreign households based
on income expectations for the following twelve months in addition to gender, age group,
education group, income group, and social status. The results are virtually identical.
Germany had negative residential property price inflation throughout our sample
period and real GDP growth increased from 1.6% in the last quarter of 2005 to 4.38% in
the last quarter of 2006.
Months and years dummies to control for seasonality and aggregate effects and shocks
have little impact on our findings (see columns (1) and (2) of Table A.1). We might also
interpret the answers to the survey questions as ordered options and estimate an ordered
probit model. Even in this case, we estimate marginal effects in line with our baseline
estimates (see column (3)). A linear probability model estimates consistent marginal
effects (column (4)). In column (5), we add a set of dummies for all the elicited answers
on inflation expectations instead of our single dummy for an expected inflation increase.
The average marginal effect of “prices will increase more” rises to 10.5%. Households
that expect prices to rise more in the next twelve months compared to the previous
twelve months are also on average 3% less likely to say that it is a bad time to purchase
durables.
Households that expect inflation to increase are also more likely to answer that it is
a bad time to save (see Table 6).
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Figure A.1: Cyclical Readiness to Spend on Durables and Real Durable
Consumption
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This figure is a scatter plot of the cyclical components of the average monthly readiness to purchase durables
over time and of the natural logarithm of the real durable consumption at the quarterly frequency. We use
a Hodrick–Prescott filter with smoothing parameter λ = 1, 600 to estimate the cyclical component. We use
the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct the readiness
to purchase durables index. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households whether it is a good time
to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Higher values correspond to better times. We
use the end of quarter value to get a quarterly time series. The sample period is fist quarter 2000 to fourth
quarter 2013 for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure A.2: Interest Rates for Consumption Loans
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This figure plots the monthly time series of the bank interest rates for consumption loans to German
households in percent at an annual rate. The sample period is first quarter 2000 to forth quarter 2013
for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure A.3: Residential Property Price Inflation Rate
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This figure plots the monthly time series of the German residential property price inflation rate in percent
at an annual rate. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure A.4: Policy Uncertainty
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This figure plots the monthly policy uncertainty index of Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) over time. The
sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen years.
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Figure A.5: Change in the Readiness to Spend on Durables for German vs.
foreign households
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Average Treatment Effect Over Time
Two−Standard Error Bounds
This figure plots the βm coefficient (solid line) of ∆Duri,06/2005→m = α+βm×V ATshocki+∆X ′i,06/2005→m×
γ + i and two standard deviation error bands (dashed line). ∆Duri,06/2005→m is the difference in the
willingness to spend on durable goods between month m and June 2005, V ATshocki is an indicator which
equals 1 if the household was exposed to the VAT shock, βm captures the effect of the VAT shock on the
willingness to buy durables for household i in month m, and ∆X ′i,06/2005→m is the difference in a set of
observables between month m and the baseline month. We use the micro data underlying the Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission harmonized consumer surveys to
construct these variables.
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Figure A.6: Readiness to Spend on Durables and Inflation Expectations Over
Time
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This figure plots the average marginal effect of inflation expectation on households’ readiness to purchase
durable goods of a multinomial logit regression over time and two standard deviation error bands. Inflation
expectation is a dummy variable which equals 1 when a household replies that inflation will increase. The
full set of covariates was added (see Table 2). We use the micro data underlying the GfK Consumer
Climate MAXX survey to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households
on a monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions.
Households can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time.
Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for
a total of fourteen years.
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Table A.1: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: month & year
dummies, ordered probit, OLS, inflation dummies
This table reports the average marginal effects of multinomial logit, ordered probit, and OLS regressions for different
time periods. Households’ readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation expectation is a
dummy variable which equals 1 when a household replies that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the
household perception of the increase in consumer prices during the last twelve months. We also control for household
demographics and household expectations. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer
Climate MAXX survey to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households on a
monthly basis whether it is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Households
can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. Standard errors
are clustered at the quarter level. The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen
years. Column (1) adds month fixed effects; column (2) adds year fixed effects; column (3) estimates an ordered
probit specification; column (4) estimates an OLS specification; column (5) adds separate dummies for inflation
categories.
Month Year Ordered Inflation
dummies dummies probit OLS dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inflation expectation 0.0878∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0988∗∗∗
(0.0151) (0.0070) (0.0139) (0.0272)
Prices will increase less 0.0234∗∗∗
(0.0061)
Prices will increase the same 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.0073)
Prices will increase more 0.1048∗∗∗
(0.0193)
Past Inflation −0.0200∗∗∗ −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0291∗∗∗ −0.0598∗∗∗ −0.0237∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0061) (0.0034)
Demographics X X X X X
Individual expectations X X X X X
Pseudo R-sqr 0.0657 0.0819 0.0564 0.1056 0.0657
Nobs 219,799 219,799 219,799 219,799 215,579
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
25
Table A.2: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: VAT Experiment
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression for different time periods.
Households’ readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which
equals 1 when a household replies that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of
the increase in consumer prices during the last twelve months. We also control for household demographics and
household expectations. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey
to construct these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households on a monthly basis whether it
is a good time to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Households can reply that it is a good
time, it is a bad time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level.
The sample period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen years. Column (1) restricts the sample
to 11/2005–12/2006 to study the effect of the unexpected VAT increase in 2007 which was announced in November
2005, column (2) excludes the period 11/2005–12/2006, and column (3) restricts the sample to 2010–2012 to study
the effect of the European sovereign debt crisis.
11/2005 – 12/2006 excluding 11/2005 – 12/2006 2010–2012
Good time Good time Good time
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation increase 0.1909∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗
(0.0067) (0.0031) (0.0052)
Past Inflation 0.0206∗∗∗ −0.0146∗∗∗ −0.0129∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0043)
Demographics X X X
Individual expectations X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0631 0.0676 0.0466
Nobs 19,477 200,322 48,982
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: Homeownership
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression by home ownership. Households’
readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which equals 1 when
a household replies that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of the increase
in consumer prices during the last twelve months. We also control for household demographics and household
expectations. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct
these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households on a monthly basis whether it is a good time
to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Households can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad
time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. The sample
period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen years. Column (1) restricts the sample to home
owners, column (2) to apartment owners, and column (3) to renters.
House owner Apartment owner Renter
Good time Good time Good time
(1) (2) (3)
Inflation increase 0.0834∗∗∗ 0.0766∗∗∗ 0.0938∗∗∗
(0.0173) (0.0191) (0.0156)
Past Inflation −0.0216∗∗∗ −0.0228∗∗∗ −0.0186∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0039)
Demographics X X X
Individual expectations X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0616 0.0607 0.0665
Nobs 90,021 13,641 116,137
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Inflation Expectations and Readiness to Spend: Employment
This table reports the average marginal effects of a multinomial logit regression by employment status. Households’
readiness to purchase durables is the dependent variable. Inflation increase is a dummy variable which equals 1 when
a household replies that inflation will increase. Past inflation measures the household perception of the increase
in consumer prices during the last twelve months. We also control for household demographics and household
expectations. We use the confidential micro data underlying the GfK Consumer Climate MAXX survey to construct
these variables. GfK asks a representative sample of 2,000 households on a monthly basis whether it is a good time
to purchase durables given the current economic conditions. Households can reply that it is a good time, it is a bad
time, or it is neither a good time nor a bad time. Standard errors are clustered at the quarter level. The sample
period is January 2000 to December 2013 for a total of fourteen years. Columns (1) and (2) restrict the sample to
full-time employed respondents, columns (3) and (4) to part-time employed respondents, and columns (5) and (6)
to unemployed respondents.
Full-time Employment Part-time Employment Not Employed
Bad time Good time Bad time Good time Bad time Good time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation increase −0.0051 0.0923∗∗∗ −0.0072 0.0845∗∗∗ −0.0103 0.0852∗∗∗
(0.0080) (0.0169) (0.0100) (0.0186) (0.0098) (0.0149)
Past Inflation 0.0345∗∗∗ −0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0355∗∗∗ −0.0209∗∗∗ 0.0413∗∗∗ −0.0203∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Demographics X X X X X X
Individual expectations X X X X X X
Pseudo R2 0.0655 0.0623 0.0617
Nobs 96,555 30,238 93,006
Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01
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